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This paper investigates some of the existing hypotheses regarding the transmission of 
different colonial legacies to modern day economic growth. The fact that different 
colonial strategies were pursued by different colonizers in various territories suggests 
possible ramifications for current development paths. This paper attempts to understand 
why economic growth performance is different even among African countries, where 
former British colonies appear to do marginally better. It focuses on two key channels 
of transmission, namely education and trade. Thirty-six Sub-Saharan African countries 
during the period 1960–2000 are considered using Hausman-Taylor estimation 
techniquein an annualized panel data framework. In contrast with the methodology of 
previous studieswhere only the initial conditions at independence were held to influence 
the post-colonialgrowth path, this study attempts to distinguish the direct …/ 
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influences of colonization from the indirect influences by combining both the initial 
conditions at independence alongside the subsequent post-independence changes in 
explaining growth differences amongst former Sub-Saharan African colonies.The 
results suggest that the indirect influences of colonial educational policies matter more 
for post-colonial growth than the direct influences.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, a substantial volume of literature has dwelled on the subject of 
colonization and economic performance of former colonies. Economists became 
interested in colonial legacies in their search for the reasons why some countries have 
grown relatively slower than others. Notably, recent cross-country empirical evidence 
suggests that the identity of the colonizing power (or colonial origin) might help explain 
the observed growth differential amongst former colonies around the world.
1 In 
particular, it is claimed that on average, former British colonies have grown faster than 
former French colonies although much controversy still surrounds the likely 
mechanisms of transmission of any such colonial legacy.  
For instance, Klerman et al.(2008)results, using a sample of 49 former colonies around 
the world during 1960–2003, found that differences in educational policies is the main 
reason why former British colonies have grown faster than former French colonies. In 
addition, Klerman et al.(2008) show that colonial origin does not matter after 
geographical factors are controlled for, which lends support to the initial endowments 
hypothesis2 that differences in the initial conditions of pre-colonization rather than in 
colonial policy (legal, educational, or other) are the best explanation for different 
growth rates amongst former colonies. However, Klerman et al.’s(2008) results, as they 
themselves admit, are inconclusive, due to their high sensitivity to regional 
considerations and to the choice of sample considered.
3 To be thorough on this, I choose 
to focus mainly on the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) sample of countries which does not 
seem to suggest an important difference in initial geographical conditions between the 
former British and French colonies.  
Another contribution to an understanding of the channels of transmission between 
colonial origin and growth is in the works of Rostowski and Stacescu (2006; 2008), 
althoughthe primary focus of their study, likeKlerman et al. (2008), is not on the 
channels per se, but rather on the primacy between legal origin versus colonial origin on 
growth. Like Klerman et al. (2008), Rostowski and Stacescu(2006; 2008) also find that 
colonial origin matters more than legal origin and education is the likely channel 
through which colonial origin affects growth. In the context of this study, the main 
problem with the Rostowski and Stacescu papers, as with the Klerman et al. paper, is 
that they do not probe into the different mechanisms through which colonial origin 
affects growth and their analyses are limited to the initial conditions at independence. 
Remarkable in the conclusion ofthe Rostowski and Stacescu paper is the suggestion 
that: ‘examining the channels through which colonial origin could affect growth is 
therefore the first priority for future research’.(Rostowski and Stacescu 2006: 17). 
The other empirical studies that investigate the impact of colonial heritage on growth 
documented in the literature have mainly focused either on the channel of initial 
                                                 
1  See for instance, the works by Klerman et al. (2008), Rostowski and Stacescu (2006; 2008), Price 
(2003), Bertocchi and Canova (2002), and Grier (1999). 
2  Pioneered in the works of Engerman and Sokoloff (2002). 
3  For instance, Klerman et al. (2008) admit that their results controlling for geographical factors are 
highly dependent on their definition of the regional dummies for Latin America and SSA and on 
which set of countries is analysed.   2
geographical conditions4 (or betterstill, the disease environment)or on the legal 
channel.5 
The objective of this paper is to investigate further on the channels through which 
colonial origin affects economic growth performance, focusing only on the SSA sample. 
Besides limiting the sample of study to a set of countries which does not suggest any 
important difference in the impact of initial geographical conditions, this paper goes 
beyond all the previous studies by distinguishing the direct effects of colonial legacies 
from the indirect effects. In other words, attempting to separate the initial independence 
conditions from the subsequent changes introduced by the independent African states.  
The sample of study comprises 36 SSA countries during the period 1960–2000 using 
the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimation technique in an annualized panel data framework. 
We investigate two likely transmission channels between colonial origin and growth, 
namely, education and trade. In contrast with the methodology of previous studieswhere 
only the initial conditions at independence were held to influence the post-
colonialgrowth path, this study attempts to distinguish the direct influences of 
colonization from the indirect influences by combining both the initial conditions at 
independence alongside the subsequent post-independence changes in explaining 
growth differences amongst former SSA colonies. In other words, the rationale for 
including the initial conditions at independence, alongside the subsequent post-
independence changes is to distinguish whether what really mattered was the 
persistence of initial conditions left by the colonizers, or whether the evolution of the 
society after independence had any significant impact on post-independence growth 
performance. Or betterstill,‘removing’ the impact of the history of the colonizer so as to 
see whether the changes that the newly independent nations ‘added on’ could separately 
explain the economic growth path of different countries. 
The results suggest that the indirect influences of colonial educational policies matter 
more for post-colonial growth than the direct influences. The results further suggest that 
former British SSA colonies have grown marginally faster than former French colonies 
during 1960–2000, and this is attributable to the favourable contribution of the indirect 
influence of the legacy of British colonization in education. I do not find any evidence 
in support of the trade transmission mechanism. The empirical literature has recently 
emphasized the specific colonial policy of education as the likely transmission 
mechanism between colonial origin and growth but none of the previous studies, to the 
best of my knowledge, have differentiated the direct effects of the legacy of colonial 
educational policy from the indirect effects. By suggesting that the post-independence 
education conditions matter more than the initial independence education conditions, 
                                                 
4  See for instance, Price (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002). 
5  The protagonists of this debate are La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1997; 1998; 
1999) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). See also Mahoney (2001) and Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000), Levine, Beck, and Demirgüç-Kunt (2002). These cross-country studies 
show that countries that followed the English Common Law legal tradition, by colonization or 
conquest, have on average grown faster than countries that followed the Civil Law tradition 
specifically, the French Civil Law countries. However, recent evidence as shown in the works of 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Klerman et al. (2008) suggests that legal origin cannot explain 
economic growth performance. Roe and Siegel (2009), also present a range of conceptual and factual 
evidence in support of why the legal origins explanations are flawed.   3
this evidence contradicts the findings of previous studies, which suggest that the 
independence education conditions alone are a statistically significant determinant of 
the post-colonial growth path. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that although education has been largely detrimental to 
post-colonial growth performance in SSA, former British colonies do marginally better 
than former French colonies because the inherited educational system is more akin to 
produce development. These findings suggest that the choices made by European 
colonizers during the colonization of Africa, notably, in educational policies, continue 
to matter today and are a crucial determinant of growth differences across the continent. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical 
overview of the likely mechanisms of transmission at work between colonial origins and 
growth, while Section 3 presents the methodology of the study. Section 4 discusses the 
key findings and checks for their robustness and also compares my results to those in 
the literature, notably by Klerman et al. (2008), Rostowski and Stacescu (2006; 2008), 
Bertocchi and Canova (2002), and Grier (1999), while Section 5 concludes.  
2  Historical overview of the likely mechanisms of transmission between colonial 
origins and growth  
Historical sources claim that as of the late nineteenth century, Britain was the only 
imperial power that was committed to free trade, whilst the other European powers, 
notably France, were still building up their rival industries through protectionism.
6 
Correspondingly, whilst British colonial economies were not under the obligation to 
export only to Britain, French colonial economies were compelled to trade mainly with 
France.
7 As such, it can be argued that one of the important legacies of British 
colonization on its former colonies has been a long exposure to world competition 
through trade openness,
8 which might possibly explain why former British SSA 
colonies adjusted more rapidly to structural adjustment programmes implemented in the 
late 1980s in comparison with their French counterparts.
9 
Another important legacy of colonization, which has found much lesser expression in 
the cross-country empirical growth literature, is the distortionary impact of different 
colonial taxation systems on private investment incentives.10 Historical sources
11 claim 
                                                 
6  Grier (1999) reports that, Britain had had a free trade policy from 1830, and as from 1846, British 
colonies were no longer forced to give British goods preferential treatment. Hence these colonies have 
had a long history of free trade, while the French enforced mercantilist and protectionist measures 
throughout the colonial period. For additional evidence see also, Maddison (1971), Bolton (1973), and 
Gannand Duignan (1970). 
7  See Fieldhouse (1966). 
8  During the inter-war period, Nigeria alone exported five times as much as all the French colonies in 
West Africa(Rostowski and Stacescu 2006). 
9  The evidence also points to the fact that former British SSA colonies grew much faster than French 
SSA colonies after structural adjustment. 
10 The few existing works are single country studies, notably, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) on India and 
Berger (2009) on Nigeria. 
11 See for instance, Crowder (1968) and Asiwaju (2000).   4
that the dual system of administration of their colonies, characterized by punitive 
taxation and forced labour on the general population, was a distinctive feature of French 
colonial rule in SSA.
12 The implication of this unique approach to local administration 
is to be found in the colonial legacy of taxation pursued in the post-colonial era. By 
contrast, Maddison (1971) has argued that one of the important legacies of British 
colonization is that its former colonies inherited relatively lower levels of taxation, 
because indirect rule is cheaper to administer compared to direct rule, which was 
characteristic of French colonial rule. Austin (2008) also argues that until very late in 
the colonial period, there was no direct taxation in southern Ghana and Nigeria—two of 
the most successful British colonies in tropical Africa. If this is true, then it could imply 
that former British colonies are associated with relatively lower degrees of distortions of 
economic activity through taxation, which could in turn imply greater private 
investment incentives or more free trade on the domestic scale. 
Furthermore, it is well documented that educational policy was potentially the area of 
greatest distinction between different imperial colonial administrations. It is generally 
claimed that Britain pursued more enlightened educational policies in its colonies than 
did France, whose educational objective aimed essentially at training personnel for the 
colonial bureaucracy. For instance, Gann and Duignan (1970: 354), argue that 
Mission teachers in British Africa not only taught their pupils how to 
read and write, but also taught them how to try their hands at many 
different jobs because the teachers themselves, besides giving lessons, 
were also engaged in such diverse activities as constructing their own 
buildings, cultivating their own crops, experimenting in agriculture and 
building roads. 
In addition, it is widely held that primary instruction in former British colonies was 
administered through village schools using native teachers and the local vernacular 
languages of the people, whilst in former French colonies, pupils were generally 
boarded from their homes to far away schools where they were taught in French by 
French teachers, using French textbooks. This is suggestive of a different approach to 
educational provision with different repercussions on post-independence human capital 
accumulation, and development. 
Finally, an important colonial legacy that also merits further attention in the empirical 
literature is the impact of the Franc CFA
13 currency board which links France to most of 
its former SSA colonies. This, especially as Julan (2010) has recently shown that being 
part of the Franc FCA currency board increases the likelihood of currency crisis which 
might impede economic performance. The Franc CFA currency board, it is also argued, 
has been instrumental in lowering inflation and the black market exchange premium 
while enhancing the contribution of imports to GDP growth. However, as the evidence 
suggests, the impact of the currency board on economicperformance could go the other 
                                                 
12 Crowder (1968) argues that the ‘code d’indigénat’, which was instituted in French SSA aimed at 
achieving the employment of native labour through the imposition of relatively high taxes on blacks 
and in default of payment they would incur a sentence of forced labour. 
13 The Franc CFA stands for Franc de la Communauté Financiere en Afrique, meaning Financial 
Community of Africa Franc.   5
way.
14Thus, a major distinction between the former British and French SSA colonies 
has been the fact that almost all former British SSA colonies have floating exchange 
regimes, whereas, almost all former French SSA colonies operate under a fixed 
exchange regime. 
In summary, this paper will focus primarily on two likely channels of transmission 
between colonial origins and growth.  
•  The education or human capital channel, which will be proxied by two 
variables, namely, secondary enrolment rates during 1960–2000 (SEC), and the 
average years of schooling in the population aged 15 and above during 1960–
2000 (AYS). 
•  The trade channel, which will be proxied by the export share in GDP during 
1960–2000 (EXP) and openness to international trade during 1960–2000 
(OPEN). 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Empirical  model 
The questions I seek to answer in this paper are whether colonial origin really matters 
for post-independence economic growth in SSA, and if yes, what are its channels of 
transmission?  
To answer these questions, I specify the regression model as follows 
        = +         +            +ŋ             +              +   
+     (1) 
where 
-         is the per capita GDP growth during 1960–2000, 
-       is a matrix of colonial origin dummies comprising BCORG (which takes the 
value 1 for British colonial origin and zero otherwise), FCORG (which takes the value 1 
for French colonial origin and zero otherwise) and PCORG (which takes the value 1 for 
Portuguese former coloniesand zero otherwise) and BECORG (which takes the value 1 
for Belgian former coloniesand zero otherwise),
15 
-          is a matrix of control variables that serve as likely transmission channels 
between colonial origin and growth, 
                                                 
14 For instance, one of the main arguments for devaluing the Franc CFA by 50 per cent in January 1994, 
was because of its excessively distortionary effects on the economies of those countries. See Collier 
and Gunning (1999). 
15 Of course, only three of the colonial origin dummies enter the regression at a time, while the fourth 
dummy serves as base.   6
-            is a matrix of interaction terms linking colonial origin dummies(     ) 
with the transmission mechanisms (        ). A model with interaction terms can be 
presented in a simplified form as 
 = +      +        +        +    
Where     and    represent the matrix of transmission channels and the vector of 
colonial origin dummies respectively. Thus, 
  
   
= +      tells us whether the impact 
of a specific transmission channel is significantly different across colonial origins. 
-            is a matrix of control variables that are standard in the growth literature, 
in addition to controls for the duration of colonization, 
-     is a vector of individual country effects reflecting unobservable country 
heterogeneity, and     is a vector of error terms.  
3.2  Choice of estimator 
I perform my analysis on the empirical model specified in Equation (1), using a core 
dataset of thirty-six SSA countries during 1960–2000. A key consideration in choosing 
a suitable estimator for the model is how well the estimator handles the problem of 
endogeneity resulting from the fact that some of the explanatory variables might be 
correlated with the unobserved country effects. As Baltagi (2001) argues, the fixed 
effects (within) estimator assumes that all the explanatory variables are related to the 
individual effects and the within-estimator is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) 
once the individual effects are modelled as a linear function of all the explanatory 
variables. Using the within-transformation (henceforth FE) in estimating Equation (1) 
above, results in the elimination of the    term, and hence the bias. However, the FE 
also eliminates the time-invariant regressors, and is therefore incapable of giving 
estimates of    and   . 
The random-effects (RE) model, on the other hand, assumes no correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the individual effects, implying that, in the presence of 
endogeneity RE will yield biased estimates. Hence, inferences from the RE model are 
likely to be misleading. This is equally true for the OLS estimator, which also assumes 
exogeneity of all regressors and the random individual effects. 
Against these two contrasting worlds of all or nothing correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors, Hausman and Taylor (1981) in Baltagi, Bresson, 
and Pirotte (2003) proposed a model where some of the regressors, but not all, are 
correlated with the individual effects. The HT model thus bridges the two extreme 
worlds of all (FE world) or nothing (RE world) choice of correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors. As Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte(2003) have 
argued, the HT model is preferable whenever the model requires some of the regressors, 
but not all, to be correlated with the individual effects. 
The HT model can be written as 
    =       +     +    +                                (2) 
where   = 1,2,….  and   = 1,2,…. . ℎ      is     0,  
  .   7
Both  and      are independent of each other and among themselves. The    are 
individual time-invariant variables. 
Hausman and Taylor split =   ,            =    ,    into two sets of variables such 
that    is  ×   ,    is ×   ,    is  ×   ,    is ×   , and  =    . 
  and   are assumed exogenous and not correlated with    and     , while   and   are 
endogenous due to their correlation with    but not with     . 
Under Equation (2), OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates, while the FE (or 
within-transformation) estimator gives consistent estimates. The FE sleeps the    and 
removes the bias, but, in the process, it also eliminates the time-invariant variables,  . 
Hence it cannot yield estimates of  . The RE estimator, which is a generalized least 
square estimation on Equation (2), ignores the endogeneity due to the presence of the    
term and will therefore yield biased though consistent estimates. 
To get around the shortcomings of the within-estimator in estimating the time-invariant 
regressors, Hausman and Taylor suggest an instrumental variable estimator which pre-
multiplies Equation (2) by Ω
  
   where Ω is the variance-covariance term of the error 
component   +    , and then performs two-stage least squares (2SLS) using as 
instruments    ,  ,   .   is the within-transformation matrix with    =     having a 
typical element       =     −     where      is the individual mean. As Baltagi, Bresson, and 
Pirotte(2003) show, this turns out to be equivalent to running 2SLS with     ,    ,     as 
the set of instruments.16 
It is important to emphasize that the order of identification   ≥    must hold for 
Equation (2) to be non-singular. In other words, the number of time-varying exogenous 
regressors     must be at least as large as the number of individual time-invariant 
endogenous regressors   . Specifically, the model is said to be just-identified, when 
   =     and in this case, the HT estimates of   are equivalent to estimates obtained 
from 2SLS estimation. The model is said to be over-identified, when    >    and in this 
case, the HT estimates of   are more efficient than estimates obtained from the FE 
estimator. Finally, the model is under-identified when    <    and in this case, the HT 
model cannot provide estimates of  . 
3.3 Estimation  strategy 
In order to answer the question whether colonial origin matters for economic growth in 
SSA, I specify a simple growth model in which the only explanatory variables are the 
various colonial origin dummies (BCORG, FCORG, PCORG, and BECORG). This is 
easily achieved using OLS with robust standard errors.  
To determine which transmission mechanisms are at work, I include variables that 
capture the different transmission channels, alongside their corresponding interaction 
                                                 
16 Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2003) also argue that the HT estimator is based on an instrumental 
variable estimator which uses both the between and within variation of the strictly exogenous 
variables as instruments. More specifically, the individual means of the strictly exogenous regressors 
are used as instruments for the time-invariant regressors that are correlated with the individual effects, 
as in Baltagi (2001).   8
terms with colonial origin dummies. To distinguish the direct effects of colonization 
(i.e. impacts of colonial legacies measured in the year of independence) from the 
indirect effects (i.e. the impacts the additional changes brought in by the independent 
African states), I include for each transmission channel considered, the time-invariant 
values measured in the year of independence and the time-variant values measured 
throughout the period of analysis. I also include control variables that are standard in the 
growth literature in addition to controls for the duration of colonization. I test for 
robustness of the results by using alternative proxies for the transmission channels and 
alternative estimation techniques, as well as different time intervals (five-year and ten-
year period averages). The dependent variable in all model specifications is the annual 
growth rate of per capita GDP during 1960–2000.  
Thus, the principal explanatory variables in each model specification are the time-
invariant educational and trade variables measured in the year of independence of each 
country included in the sample, the corresponding time-variant educational and trade 
variables alongside their corresponding interaction terms with colonial origin dummies. 
A statistically significant sign on the time-invariant educational and trade variables 
measured in the year of independence would suggest a strong direct influence of the 
transmission channels on post-colonial growth, while a statistically significant sign on 
the time-variant educational and trade variables would suggest a strong indirect 
influence of the transmission mechanism and vice versa.  
Irrespective of the nature of the influence of the channel (direct or indirect), it would be 
important to know whether the impact of the channel is identical across the board for all 
colonial origins or it matters disparately across colonial origins—which is the role of the 
interaction terms between the transmission variables and colonial origin dummies in the 
regression models. 
3.4  Variables and data 
The dependent variable in all model specifications is the per capita GDP growth during 
1960–2000 (GROW). Amongst the explanatory variables, I include the colonial origin 
dummies. I classify the SSA countries in the sample into four broad colonial origin 
families: (i) British colonial origin (BCORG) for colonies that acquired their 
independence from Britain, (ii) French colonial origin (FCORG) for countries that 
acquired independence from France, (iii) Portuguese colonial origin (PCORG) for 
countries that acquired their independence from Portugal, and (iv) Belgian colonial 
origin (BECORG) for countries that acquired their independence from Belgium. By 
basing colonial origin on the identity of the colonizer through which independence was 
acquired, I am assuming in line with the tradition in the literature, that it is the colonial 
power that granted independence that significantly shaped the country’s post-colonial 
future.
17 Countries that witnessed a relatively short period of colonization (e.g. Ethiopia) 
                                                 
17 This might be a significant limitation, especially for those countries that had more than one European 
colonial experience. This is especially true for Cameroon and all the former German colonies (Togo, 
Tanzania, and Namibia). One way to get around this limitation is to add another set of dummy 
variables capturing ‘prior colonizers’. However, this option leaves me with another problem—that of 
a small sample—as a result of the reduced degrees of freedom. Furthermore, this detail adds less to 
the analysis. Admittedly, including the ‘prior colonizers’ would add substantially to the results only 
where the first colonizer stayed for a significant period. This is perhaps true only for South Africa,   9
or which were never colonized (e.g. Liberia) are excluded from the sample. 
Furthermore, countries that had multiple colonization experiences with the experience 
of the previous colonizers impacting for a significant period of the country’s colonial 
history (e.g. South Africa) are also excluded. I also exclude Cape Verde and the 
Comoros Islands for lack of consistent data. Table 1 provides a classification of the 
countries in the dataset together with their dates of colonization and independence. 
Besides the colonial origin dummies, the other choice explanatory variables are a set of 
variables that capture the two transmission mechanisms between colonial origin and 
growth. These are: 
•  The gross secondary enrolment rates during 1960–2000 (SEC) to capture the 
education or human capital transmission channel. The conventional growth 
literature suggests that human capital enhancement is good for growth either 
because it raises the overall productivity of the economy or because it favours 
the development of pro-growth institutions.
18 However, this evidence is 
inconclusive as other empirical studies, notably by Pritchett (2001), suggest that 
growth in human capital could be detrimental for per capita GDP growth. The 
interaction terms of colonial origin with secondary enrolment rates during 1960–
2000, are SEC_BRI, SEC_FRE, SEC_POR and SEC_BEL, for British, French, 
Portuguese, and Belgian colonial origins respectively. I also include the time-
invariant secondary enrolment rates measured in the year of independence of 
each country included in the sample (SEC_IND). For robustness, I use an 
alternative measure of education, namely, the average schooling years in 
population aged 15 years and above. Hence, the independence measure for 
average schooling years is AYS_IND, while the post-colonial measure (AYS) 
and its interaction terms are given by (AYS_BRI, AYS_FRE, AYS_POR, and 
AYS_BEL).  
•  The average share of exports in GDP during 1960–2000 (EXP) to capture the 
trade transmission mechanism. The literature suggests that SSA countries that 
were more open to trade have indeed grown faster than those that were 
not.
19Rodrik (2002) however holds a dissenting view. Thus, the sign on exports 
in the regressions can go either way. The interaction terms of colonial origin 
with exports during 1960–2000 are EXP_BRI, EXP_FRE, EXP_POR, and 
EXP_BEL, for British, French, Portuguese, and Belgian colonial origins 
respectively. Similarly, the export measure in the year of independence of the 
country is represented by EXP_IND. Where necessary, I use openness to 
international markets as alternative proxy for the trade channel. 
Furthermore, I introduce another set of six control variables that are standard in the 
growth literature. These are: 
•  The natural logarithm of initial real per capita GDP in 1960 (LOGPCGDP60) to 
capture convergence effects. Quah (1993) argues that due to the problem of 
                                                                                                                                             
which had a long Dutch tenure followed by extended British rule, but I have excluded this case from 
the sample. 
18 For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) and Glaeser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) find a 
positive contribution of human capital to GDP growth in their regressions. 
19 See, for instance, Sachs and Warner (1997).   10
reversion to the mean, the sign on initial per capita income can either be positive 
or negative depending on the sample. 
•  The growth rate of population during 1960–2000 (GPO) to control for the effect 
of demographic factors on growth. I follow the endogenous growth literature, 
notably by Kremer (1993) in suggesting a possible correlation between labour 
force growth (proxied by population growth) and income growth and the two are 
expected to be positively correlated. Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) suggest the 
opposite. 
•  The inflation rate during 1960–2000 (INFL) to capture the negative effects of 
price instability on growth. Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1977) in Grier (1999: 
322) both claim that inflation uncertainty increases price variability, thus 
harming economic growth. 
•  The average share of real investment
20 in GDP purchasing power parity during 
1960–2000 (INV) to account for the contribution of physical capital 
accumulation in GDP growth. The standard neoclassical growth literature 
suggests that investment in physical capital is good for growth during 
transitional dynamics, although this might not be the case at steady states. The 
expected sign on INV in the regressions should therefore be positive. 
•  An annual index of the black market exchange rate premium during 1960–2000 
(BMP) to capture the effects of market distortion that might be detrimental to 
growth. Easterly and Levine (1997) find a strong negative association between 
black market premiums and growth. 
•  Finally, a measure of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ETHNIC). The 
expected sign of ETHNIC in the growth regression is negative, according to the 
evidence from Easterly and Levine (1997) and Mauro (1995).  
In addition to this set of control variables, I introduce a variable, DUREE, to capture the 
duration of colonial rule. DUREE is obtained by subtracting the respective country 
independence year from the year that the country was first colonized.
21Table 2 
summarizes the definition of variables and sources. 
Finally, I indicate the à priori classification of these variables into the various HT 
categories. The HT model requires classification of variables into the following four 
categories, namely, time-variant exogenous variables, time-invariant exogenous 
variables, time-variant endogenous variables and time-invariant endogenous variables. 
However, the latter category need not be included for the model to be correctly 
specified. 
Based on economic theory, I classify the variables into the HT model as exogenous due 
to their supposed non-correlation with both the unobserved individual effects (  ) and 
with the error term   . Similarly, I classify some variables as endogenous in the model 
because of their supposed correlation with   but not with    . I thus regroup the 
variables into the following four HT categories viz. 
                                                 
20 The variable includes both private and public investment. 
21 It would have been consistent to take into account only the year that the last colonizer arrived (for 
those countries that had multiple colonization experiences) but this detail would not add much to the 
present analysis.   11
•  Time variant exogenous variables: the black market exchange rate premium 
during 1960–2000 (BMP). Following Easterly and Levine (1997), I classify 
black market exchange premium as exogenous in the HT model because it tends 
to capture growth-inhibiting institutional imperfections that might not 
necessarily be correlated with the individual country effects. 
•  Time variant endogenous variables: secondary enrolment rates during 1960–
2000 (SEC), average years of schooling during 1960–2000 (AYS), export share 
in GDP during 1960–2000 (EXP), investment during 1960–2000 (INV), 
inflation during 1960–2000 (INFL), and population growth during 1960–2000 
(GPO). Accordingly, all the interaction terms for education and trade enter in 
this category. Following the tradition in the empirical growth literature, we 
classify these variables as endogenous in the HT model.22 
•  Time invariant endogenous variables: secondary enrolment rates at 
independence (SEC_IND), average schooling years at independence 
(AYS_IND), and export share in GDP at independence (EXP_IND). 
•  Time invariant exogenous variables: all colonial origin dummies23 (BCORG, 
FCORG, PCORG, and BECORG), the duration of colonial rule (DUREE), the 
natural logarithm of initial per capita GDP in 1960 (LOGPCGDP60), and 
ETHNIC.  
Table 3 provides summary descriptive statistics of variables included in the sample 
while Table 4 provides the partial correlation coefficients. Most of my data come from 
the Global Development Finance and the World Development Indicators. The partial 
correlation results below suggest that the duration of colonization is strongly positively 
correlated with the education and trade variables, and the independence education 
measures (SEC_IND and AYS_IND) are also strongly positively correlated with the 
post-independence education variables (SEC and AYS, respectively), which suggests a 
strong persistence of colonial educational practices in the post-colonial era. This is also 
true for the independence trade (EXP_IND) and post-independence trade (EXP) 
variables. 
4 Discussion  of  results 
The discussion of the results follows the two-stage empirical strategy. Accordingly, I 
first analyse stage one results based on simple OLS estimation and then proceed to stage 
two results based on the HT estimator. 
4.1  Stage one results based on simple OLS 
Table 5 presents the results from three model specifications of Equation (1). Model 1 
includes only colonial origin dummies as explanatory variables for growth and tests the 
hypothesis that colonial origin matters for growth in SSA. The results suggest that, 
indeed, colonial origin matters and former British SSA colonies have grown on average 
                                                 
22 For instance, Glaeser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) treat human capital as endogenous while 
Rostowski and Stacescu (2006) treat both human capital and openness as endogenous in their 
regressions. 
23 The intuition for placing colonial origin dummies in this category is mainly because of selection 
effects.   12
roughly 1 percentage point faster than former French colonies. However, there seems to 
be no significant difference in growth between the former French, Portuguese, or 
Belgian SSA colonies. 
Model 2, includes, in addition to the colonial origin dummies, the transmission 
mechanisms investigated (trade measured by EXP and EXP_IND and education 
measured by SEC and SEC_IND), controls for the duration of colonization and all the 
other controls that are standard in growth models. The former British colonial origin 
dummy (BCORG) loses all of its statistical significance and also diminishes in 
magnitude while the former Portuguese colonial origin dummy (PCORG) gains 
statistical as well as economic significance. This result suggests that former Portuguese 
colonies have grown averagely 7 percentage points faster than former French colonies. 
Of the two transmission mechanisms tested, only the education channel appears to 
matter while the trade channel is insignificant. Of the two education channel variables, 
only SEC is statistically significant (at 1 per cent level), although negative, suggesting 
that the indirect influence of colonial educational policies matters more than the direct 
influence. This result also suggests that the contribution of human capital development 
to SSA growth during 1960–2000 has generally been detrimental, which is Pritchett-
consistent.  
Model 3 tests the robustness of the results in Model 2 by using an alternative measure of 
the education channel, namely, the average schooling years in the population aged 15 
and above (AYS and AYS_IND). The results in Model 3 basically uphold the results of 
Model 2 with the only difference that both the direct and indirect effects of colonial 
educational policies matter for post-independence growth performance. However, the 
direct effects of the legacy of colonial education have had a positive repercussion while 
the indirect effects have had a negative repercussion. In other words, the legacy of 
colonial education practices per se, has had positive repercussions on post-independence 
growth while the additional changes brought in by the independent African states have 
had a negative effect on growth.  
The findings from these different model specifications give an idea of the possible 
transmission channel between colonial origin and growth in SSA. However, because of 
the bias and inconsistency of OLS estimation, this evidence is inconclusive and requires 
further investigation using alternative techniques and measurement. 
4.2  Stage two results based on HT estimation 
Table 6 presents the results from four model specifications of Equation (1). Model 1 
includes, in addition to the colonial origin dummies, the transmission channelvariables 
(trade measured by EXP24and education measured by SEC and SEC_IND), controls for 
the duration of colonization, and all the other controls that are standard in growth 
models. The results suggest that only the education channel matters and of the two 
education channel variables analysed, only SEC is statistically significant (at 1 per cent 
level), although negative, suggesting that the post-independence educational policies of 
                                                 
24 Based on the preliminary results of the OLS estimation presented above, only the education 
transmission channel merits further detailed empirical investigation. An additional reason for dropping 
the independence trade variable (EXP_IND) is to enable comparability of my results to those of 
previous studies.   13
the former colonies are largely responsible for the observed growth differences amongst 
these countries. In other words,the indirect influence of colonial educational policies 
matters more than the direct influence.The lack of statistical significance on the 
independence education variable (SEC_IND) suggests that the initial education 
conditions of SSA countries at independence cannot be held in explaining growth 
differences amongst former SSA colonies during 1960–2000. This result contradicts the 
findings of previous studies, notably, the works of Klerman et al. (2008), Rostowski and 
Stacescu (2006, 2008), Bertocchi and Canova (2002), and Grier (1999) where the 
independence education conditions are found to be the main determinants of the post-
colonial growth path.  
The results in Model 2 which controls for possible differences in post-independence 
educational policies across colonial origins reveal a positive and highly statistically 
significant (at 1 per cent) sign on the British colonial origin post-independence 
education interaction term (SEC_BRI) suggesting that, in comparison with former 
French colonies, the post-independence education conditions in former British SSA 
colonies have been more favourable to growth. In other words, the reason why former 
British SSA colonies appear to do better than former French colonies is because the 
indirect influence of British colonial education legacy is more akin to produce 
development than the indirect influence of French colonial education legacy.  
The results in Models 3and 4 tests the robustness of the results in Models 1 and 2 
respectively, by using an alternative measure of the education channel, namely, the 
average schooling years in the population aged 15 and above (AYS and AYS_IND). 
The results in Model 3 basically uphold the results of Model 1 while the results of 
Model 4 uphold that of Model 2. In other words, the indirect influence of colonial 
educational policies matter more for growth than the direct influence and former British 
colonies do comparatively better than former French colonies because of a superior 
legacy of education inherited from Britain. Another important inference from the results 
in Table 6 is that, the direct influence of colonial educational practices, has positive 
(although statistically insignificant) repercussions on post-independence growth while 
the indirect influences (or additional changes brought in by the independent African 
states) have negative repercussions on growth. 
It is worth mentioning that I repeated the empirical strategy employed in this study 
using a panel every five and every ten years of all variables that span through 1960–
2000 and obtained similar results. I do not report these results here due to space 
constraints, however, they are available on request. 
In conclusion, it is worth recalling that only one of the two transmission channels 
explored has survived after subjection to alternative techniques, time frame of analysis, 
and to alternative proxies, namely, the education channel. I do not find any evidence in 
support of the trade channel.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper sought to investigate whether colonial origin really matters for economic 
growth in SSA during 1960–2000 and if it does, what its likely transmission 
mechanisms are. Two likely channels of transmission, education and trade, were 
investigated. The methodology that has been applied in this study is slightly different to   14
that of previous works, where only initial conditionsat independence were held to 
influence the subsequent growth path. In contrast, this study attempts to distinguish the 
direct influences of colonization from the indirect influences by combining both the 
initial conditions at independence alongside the subsequent post-independence changes 
in explaining growth differences amongst former SSA colonies.  
The results suggest that the indirect influences of colonial educational policies matter 
more for post-colonial growth than the direct influences. The results further suggest that 
former British SSA colonies have grown marginally faster than former French colonies 
during 1960–2000, and this is attributable to the favourable contribution of the indirect 
influence of the legacy of British colonization in education. In other words, education 
has a larger positive effect on growth in former British colonies, in comparison to 
former French colonies. These findings suggest that the choices made by European 
colonizers during the colonization of Africa, notably, in educational policies, continue 
to matter today and are a crucial determinant of growth differences across the continent. 
I do not find any evidence in support of the trade transmission mechanism.  
The empirical literature has recently emphasized the specific colonial policy of 
education as the likely transmission mechanism between colonial origin and growth, but 
none of the previous studies, to the best of my knowledge, have differentiated the direct 
effects of the legacy of colonial educational policy from the indirect effects. By 
suggesting that the post-independence education conditions matter more than the initial 
independence education conditions, this evidence contradicts the findings of previous 
studies, which suggest that the independence education conditions alone are a 
statistically significant determinant of the post-colonial growth path. Further research 
should consider extending the sample of study to former colonies beyond SSA.  
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Table 1: List of countries included in the sample 





Burkina Faso 1960 1895
Cameroon 1960 1884
Niger 1960 1861
Central African Republi 1960 1880
Senegal 1959 1758
Chad 1960 1900
Congo Brazzaville 1960 1897
Gabon 1960 1839
Guinea 1958 1898






















FRENCH COLONIAL ORIGIN COUNTRIES, FCORG (15)
BRITISH COLONIAL ORIGIN COUNTRIES, BCORG (16)
PORTUGUESE COLONIAL ORIGIN COUNTRIES, PCORG (3)
BELGIAN COLONIAL ORIGIN COUNTRIES, BECORG (2)
Source: Price (2003: 481-2). 
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Table 2: Variables definition andsources 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
BCORG British Colonial Origin dummy Author
FCORG French Colonial Origin dummy Author
PCORG Portuguese Colonial Origin dummy Author
BECORG Belgian Colonial Origin dummy Author
SEC Post-Colonial Secondary Enrolment Rates (1960-2000) GDF & WDI
SEC_IND Independence Secondary Enrolment Rate GDF & WDI
SEC_BRI Post-colonial Secondary Enrolment Rates for former British Origin GDF & WDI
SEC_FRE Post-colonial Secondary Enrolment Rates for former French Origin GDF & WDI
SEC_POR Post-colonial Secondary Enrolment Rates for former Portuguese Origin GDF & WDI
SEC_BEL Post-colonial Secondary Enrolment Rates for former Belgian Origin GDF & WDI
EXP Post-Colonial Export Share in GDP (1960-2000) World Bank
EXP_IND Independence Export Share in GDP World Bank
AYS Post-Colonial Average Schooling Years in Population 15+ (1960-2000) Barro & Lee
AYS_IND Independence Average School Years in Population 15+ Barro & Lee
AYS_BRI Post-colonial Average School Years in Population 15+ for former British Origin Barro & Lee
AYS_FRE Post-colonial Average School Years in Population 15+ for former French Origin Barro & Lee
AYS_POR Post-colonial Average School Years in Population 15+ for former Portuguese Origin Barro & Lee
AYS_BEL Post-colonial Average School Years in Population 15+ for former Belgian Origin Barro & Lee
GROW Post-Colonial Per Capita GDP Growth (1960-2000) World Bank
GPO Post-Colonial Population Growth Rate (1960-2000) GDF & WDI
LOGPCGDP60 Per Capita GDP level in 1960 World Bank
DUREE Duration of Colonisation Author
BMP Black Market Exchange Premium (1960-2000) Africa Research Program
ETHNIC Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation Africa Research Program
INFL Inflation rate (1960-2000) World Bank
INV Total Investment share in GDP (1060-2000) Africa Research Program
VARIABLE LIST & DESCRIPTION
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Table 3: Summary descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  dev. Min.  Max.
GROW 1238  6.034893 9.458898 -33.33333  92.2078
GPO 1360  2.611742 .7187012 -.6744879  4.66606
LOGPCGDP60  1271 7.023608 .5592167 6.045005    8.093157
ETHNIC 1271  65.67742 22.47371  0  90
BMP 1094 
 
59.93946 282.1426  -89.16118    4806.89
    
INV 1350    10.35901  8.975847  -2.809372  69.91588
INFL  884   54.90318  817.2855  .0123   23773.13
DUREE 1394    70.97059  15.23022  55  111
SEC_IND 1394    5.321176  7.070332  1  32.12
SEC 1379    16.71777  15.32025  1  93.117
    
SEC_BRI 1379    9.566787  15.49098  0  93.117
SEC_FRE 1379    6.153485  11.44275 0  79
SEC_POR 1379    .4136563  1.981223 0  21.6
SEC_BEL 1379    .581665  3.092819 0  25.7
AYS_IND  1025   1.22084  .891196  .17   3.172
    
AYS 985    1.955401  1.320378  .16    5.73
AYS_BRI 985   1.313589  1.603382  0  5.73
AYS_FRE  985   .4967868  .8953029  0  4.68
AYS_POR 985   
 
.0256853 .1355198  0  1.19
AYS_BEL 985    .1193401 .4368924 0  3.18
    
EXP_IND  1353   24.38445  17.15794  4.861965   75.61404
EXP  1271   27.44242  16.84334  2.524708   84.11205
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Table 4: Matrix of correlation coefficients 
GROW GPO LOGPCGDP60 ETHNIC BMP INV INFL DUREE SEC_IND SEC AYS_IND AYS EXP_IND EXP
GROW 1.000
GPO 0.113 1.000
LOGPCGDP60 -0.119 -0.235 1.000
ETHNIC -0.035 0.331 0.313 1.000
BMP -0.023 -0.026 -0.024 0.025 1.000
INV 0.026 -0.132 0.038 -0.263 -0.071 1.000
INFL -0.001 0.057 -0.028 0.087 0.031 -0.087 1.000
DUREE 0.052 -0.134 -0.157 -0.233 0.109 0.454 -0.035 1.000
SEC_IND -0.049 -0.389 0.465 -0.080 0.003 0.273 -0.018 0.460 1.000
SEC -0.137 -0.261 0.209 -0.002 0.037 0.227 0.018 0.367 0.632 1.000
AYS_IND -0.039 -0.393 0.121 -0.429 -0.045 0.467 -0.051 0.541 0.656 0.444 1.000
AYS -0.178 -0.356 0.057 -0.153 -0.015 0.338 0.036 0.532 0.601 0.788 0.728 1.000
EXP_IND -0.080 -0.061 0.206 0.300 -0.004 0.067 -0.006 0.287 0.530 0.493 0.174 0.491 1.000
EXP -0.061 0.007 0.248 0.041 -0.154 0.253 -0.074 0.126 0.424 0.506 0.203 0.352 0.565 1.000
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Table 5: Preliminary results based on OLS estimation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
BCORG 1.007** 0.090 3.383
(0.553) (2.203) (3.026)
PCORG -1.045 7.760** 7.822**
(1.883) (3.321) (4.171)




























CONSTANT 5.621*** 16.274 17.570
(0.371) (10.521) (13.358)
No of Obs. 1238 620 448
R-SQUARED 0.004 0.06 0.09
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth (GROW)
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. The omitted category is French Colonial Dummy (FCORG). 




   22
Table 6: Main results using HT estimator 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BMP -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
INFL -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
GPO 1.087 1.136 0.119 0.318
(0.876) (0.879) (0.982) (1.009)
INV 0.116 0.133 -0.088 -0.049
(0.088) (0.088) (0.111) (0.112)
EXP 0.018 -0.007 -0.005 -0.029

















BCORG -3.764 -9.661 5.240 -3.615
(20.834) (26.451) (4.906) (7.063)
PCORG 1.682 -6.272 6.378 -4.463
(9.914) (21.242) (10.232) (22.460)
BECORG 3.363 4.466 2.076 5.736
(6.995) (9.079) (4.022) (7.767)
DUREE 0.132 0.139 -0.012 -0.062
(0.239) (0.335) (0.168) (0.187)
LOGPCGDP60 -1.204 -4.147 -1.354 -4.209
(16.476) (19.686) (3.056) (3.659)
ETHNIC 0.057 0.093 0.037 0.103





CONSTANT -2.550 17.345 14.989 35.111
(97.323) (114.947) (20.666) (27.841)
No of Obs. 620 620 448 448
No Groups 28 28 22 22
Prob > Chi-square 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.00
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth (GROW)
Time Invariant Endogenous Variables
Time Invariant Exogenous Variables
Time Variant Endogenous Variables
Time Variant Exogenous Variables
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.The omitted categories are French Colonial Dummies (FCORG, 
SEC_FRE, and AYS_FRE). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
 
 
 
 